Shareholder campaigns aimed at radically reshaping corporate policy and governance and extracting short-term profits at the expense of long-term value creation are once again in the news. Many think they are a recent phenomenon. But thats not the case.
In 1986 vaunted management consultant Peter Drucker lambasted short-termism in an editorial in the Wall Street Journal, declaring, Everyone who has worked with American managements can testify that the need to satisfy the pension fund managers quest for higher earnings next quarter, together with the panicky fear of the raider, constantly pushes top managements toward decisions they know to be costly, if not suicidal, mistakes.
And the evidence today the intense focus on quarterly earnings, diminishing capital investment by U.S. corporations, shrinking CEO tenure and, according to Ana Avramovic, director of trading strategy at Credit Suisse in New York, falling average holding period for shareholders to 17 weeks, among other things continues to demonstrate a push toward decisions that can be costly for shareholders.
This situation is potentially calamitous. Short-termism, often driven by activists, can have grave implications for corporations, for our economy and sometimes for society overall. Innovation, discovery and hiring are curtailed when R&D projects are put on hold or canceled because of short-term pressures. Halted development undermines long-term U.S. competitiveness, to say nothing of potentially postponing lifesaving medicines or cutting-edge technologies from reaching the public. Short-termism also leads to mispricing, misallocation of assets and a lack of reliable information about long-term prospects. But because activists are shareholders, this dynamic puts corporate leadership in a bind. Nobody will disagree that a diverse pool of investors is a goal of any business and that none should be turned away.
Some activist groups today do claim they are in it for the long haul, bringing ideas, questions and concerns to the attention of corporate boards and management, which is an essential part of any healthy relationship between a company and its shareholders. Beyond this engagement by some, however, a movement is afoot in which some board members are paid directly by activist investors, often based on benchmarks such as an increase in share price over a fixed term.
This relation is the case with two directors on Dow Chemical Co.s board who have a special compensation arrangement with hedge fund firm Third Point, which agreed to pay them stock appreciation rights that increase in value as Dow stock increases in price. At the very least, it is unclear how this director incentive-compensation arrangement does not establish an explicit obligation to Third Point at the expense of other shareholders, lead to conflicts on the board that skew the alignment of interests with shareholders and undercut the fundamental board responsibility to oversee management in the best interests of all shareholders. The question also arises as to whether these payments incentivize risky behavior by the very body that is responsible for ensuring that executive compensation does not do so.
So, in view of such an arrangement, how do we help ensure the healthy functioning of boards without compromising the role of shareholders?
We believe one way is to require transparency around these special compensation arrangements. Full disclosure would shed light on the conflicts of interest generated by these arrangements, steer the focus away from short-term results and benefit investors by providing information useful for their investment and voting decisions.
Thats why, earlier this year, Nasdaq filed a proposal with the Securities and Exchange Commission that calls for Nasdaq-listed companies to disclose all agreements and arrangements between any director or nominee and any person or entity ... that provide for compensation or other payment in connection with that persons candidacy or service as a director. Where disclosure is required, the public company would need to identify the parties and material terms of the agreement or arrangement. This proposal is simple to enact, practical and in the best interests of shareholders and corporations alike.
Activist investors have woven themselves into the fabric of corporate dynamics, with mixed results. They do have a positive and important role to play. Boards and management must be challenged by shareholders so they can continue to develop better companies. Drucker recognized this dynamic when he wrote that the managers job is to keep his nose to the grindstone while lifting his eyes to the hills.
One way to strengthen the healthy symbiosis of checks and balances between corporate leadership and shareholders is to disclose third-party payments to board members. This openness would have a mutually beneficial long-term focus. If these hidden conflicts of interest are brought into the light, we can keep our eyes on the hills and write a chapter in our capitalist story that takes a positive turn.
Edward Knight is executive vice president and general counsel of Nasdaq in Washington.
Get more on regulation.