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Ashby Monk, Ph.D., Executive Director of the Global Projects Center at Stanford University and a senior research associate at the University of Oxford, has been blogging about sovereign and pension funds since 2008. 

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Stop Being A Muppet!

March 15, 2012 at 11:00 AM EST


In 2008, the Libyan Investment Authority entrusted Goldman Sachs with $1.3 billion dollars. By 2010, that investment was worth $25 million. How does that happen? How does a “sophisticated” investor lose $1.275 billion – 98% – on a single trade? There are a variety of legitimate answers (e.g., it was a hedge), but Greg Smith’s disgruntled resignation letter in yesterday’s New York Times offers some pretty telling insights into how this may have happened. This is how he describes Goldman’s philosophy of dealing with its clients:

“...get your clients — some of whom are sophisticated, and some of whom aren’t — to trade whatever will bring the biggest profit to Goldman... I attend derivatives sales meetings where not one single minute is spent asking questions about how we can help clients. It’s purely about how we can make the most possible money off of them... It makes me ill how callously people talk about ripping their clients off. Over the last 12 months I have seen five different managing directors refer to their own clients as ‘muppets.’”

Was the Libyan Investment Authority a Goldman Sachs “muppet”? Was it convinced by unsavory Goldmanites to buy a basket of options that it had no business even getting close to? I don’t know. That's for others to decide.

Anyway, despite what you may think, I have no intention of piling in on Goldman – even if the company deserves some of what the media is giving it. Nor am I going after Greg Smith, who was almost certainly driven as much by a mid-life crisis as he was by what he saw going on around him. I get it. I bailed on Wall Street, albeit with much less pizzazz.

Actually, I’m too mad to do any of that – or I should say, I’m reminded of how mad I’ve been for a decade. What am I so mad about? That, in Greg Smith's words, the “muppets” are still being “muppets”. It’s so, so frustrating. And paragraphs like the one below give me the desire to throw something, like my laptop, through a window:

“If what Smith is saying today is true, then the biggest problem remains the “muppets.” Not Kermit or Gonzo, but the investors that Smith claims continue to buy garbage from Goldman. Until those clients start to take responsibility for themselves, Goldman will remain incentivized to sell stuff to them.”

To start, I take issue with the notion that Goldman doesn’t have a moral obligation here (I’ll come back to that). But, darn it, he’s right! The real question is why we are still trying to make the case for more sophisticated operations to the community of institutional investors -- and in particular their Boards and Sponsors. Why is it so hard for the sponsors of institutional investors to understand that they need savvy people at the helm of their organizations to avoid being taken advantage of?

This whole saga is utterly depressing because the clients – the “muppets” – are often played by pension funds, sovereign funds, endowments, foundations and other institutional investors, and these funds are increasingly crucial for maintaining the institutions we hold most dear (e.g., universities, charities, pensions, governments). What happens to University programs, like student aid, when an endowment loses money? What happens to old age income when pensions don’t have enough assets to meet liabilities? As it turns out, these “muppets” matter! In fact, they are some of the most important institutions in our society today!

So – deep breath, Ashby – this media fire storm should be (needs to be) a wakeup call to the people who oversee these funds. What lessons should they draw?

First, they can’t ask their funds to make ridiculous returns (i.e. higher than 7.5%) in order to spare them the cost of an expensive liability. It’s not fair. It pushes the pension managers into asset classes, geographies, and strategies that they can’t possibly understand.

Second, if sponsors are going to ask these funds to make ridiculously high returns, then they have to give them the tools to succeed. They can’t expect these funds to go off into the most sophisticated segments of financial markets without the resources or skills required.



FILED UNDER: Greg Smith · Good Governance
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  • POST

Well, that is embarrassing - you are right, I did not see the second page. Mea culpa.

This piece should be sent out to every investment board in the country. I saw more examples of the phenomena you cite than I ever cared to when I was a pension consultant, and think you've nailed the toxic combination of under-resourced investment staff and head-in-the-sand return expectations (all in the service of maintaining the fictions that allow for the avoidance of painful funding commitments) that have brought us to today's sorry state.

I see from your conclusion that you had some reservations about this piece, but I for one am glad you posted it.

Mar 20 2012 at 1:58 AM EST

Jason
 

Thanks for the comment. I'm curious -- did you read the second half of the article? It seems based on your comment that you may not have noticed that there was an additional 700 words that goes into the tools. Here's the single page version:
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/blogarticle/2996134/Blog/Stop-Being-A-Muppet.html?ArticleID=2996134&single=true

Mar 16 2012 at 8:38 PM EST

Ashby Monk
 

Very, very well put. Though I am confused by your second lesson - what tools are plan sponsors denying their agents that could possibly lead to this sort of behavior?

Mar 16 2012 at 8:23 PM EST